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Abstract
This paper estimates the impact of the murder of film maker Theo van
Gogh on November 2, 2004, on listed house prices in Amsterdam with a
unique dataset. We use an hedonic-market approach to show that gen-
eral attitudes towards Muslim minorities were negatively affected by the
murder. Specifically, we test for an effect on listed house prices in neigh-
borhoods where more than 25% of the people belong to an ethnic minor-
ity from a Muslim country (type I). Relative to the other neighborhoods,
house prices in type I neighborhoods decreased in 10 months by about av-
erage 3%, with a widening gap over time. The results are robust to several
adjustments including changes in the control group. There is no signifi-
cant difference in the time it takes for houses to be sold in type I versus
other neighborhoods. Finally, people belonging to the Muslim minority
were more likely to buy and less likely to sell a house in a type I neighbor-
hood after the murder than before.
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1 Introduction
The murder of columnist, tv-show host and film maker Theo van Gogh on Novem-
ber 2, 2004 in Amsterdam by a fundamentalist Muslim, had a huge impact on
Dutch society. Figure 1 shows the number of Dutch newspaper articles per week
that mentioned the murder. In the first two weeks, the murder was mentioned
in almost 4,000 unique articles. Later spikes in attention coincide with the trial
and conviction of the murderer (around week 30 of 2005), and the week one year
after the murder (November 2005, week 45). Atteveldt et al. (2005) give evi-
dence of a strong peak in the joint occurrence of the words “Islam”, “terror”, and
“immigration” on any page of a Dutch national newspaper. This peak in news
coverage is in the same order of magnitude as the coverage of the 9-11 events in
the Netherlands.1 Given the large effects of the murder of this public figure on
Dutch society, the key question in this paper is whether this event in combina-
tion with the media attention had a measurable effect on the attitudes towards
Muslims in general. We test this with an hedonic-market approach.
Specifically, we compare posted house prices in Amsterdam neighborhoods
with more than 25% Moroccan and Turkish inhabitants (which we label type I
neighborhoods) before and after the murder with house prices in the other (type
II) neighborhoods.2 We also use alternative control groups that look more like
the type I neighborhoods in terms of other characteristics. We find that after the
murder, the difference in housing prices between type I and type II neighborhoods
increased statistically significantly. We find that the relative house prices in type
I neighborhoods decreased on average by about 1.5 percent in the year after the
murder. Over time, the average decrease in the house prices is about 0.1 to 0.2
percent per week in the period after the murder. This negative impact stops after
about 10 months resulting in a decrease of 3 percent in the type I neighborhoods
if we make the conservative assumption that the trend in type I neighborhoods
would have been the same as in type II neighborhoods while it was actually
steeper before the murder. 3
We use a difference-in-difference (DID) approach to identify the impact of the
murder. This approach has become very popular in labor and development eco-
1The murder also drew a lot of media attention outside of the Netherlands, i.e. see a recent
article by Kramer in the New Yorker of April 3, 2006.
2The largest groups of non-western immigrants are Surinam, Indonesian, Turkish and Mo-
roccan. Even though the first two groups have their ethnic background from countries with a
high concentration of Muslims, the concentration among immigrants in the Netherlands is low.
In addition these groups are usually not associated with the other groups.
3If we assume the trend in type I neighborhoods to be the same as before the murder, the
estimated effect would have been 5%.
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nomics. The only other paper that applies DID to the housing market is Abadie
and Dermisi (2006). Many of the problems related to this method are less se-
vere for the housing market. This is due to the fact that houses are fixed and
cannot move between neighborhoods. Therefore, we do not have to worry about
mobility between the treatment and control group (see for example Blundell
and Costa-Dias, 2000). In addition, the murder can be regarded as an unan-
ticipated and exogenous event. Difference-in-difference methods have often been
applied to study policy changes where it is always questionable whether the pol-
icy changes are really exogenous. Still, serial correlation is a potential problem for
reasons pointed out in (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004). We deal with
this in our robustness checks. Another fundamental problem in cross sectional
neighborhood-effect studies is to distinguish between a neighborhood effect and
the aggregation of individual effects: the so called reflection problem, see Manski
(1993, 2000). However, we are not so much interested in identifying neighborhood
effects but more in the effects of the Van Gogh murder (which can be treated as
an unexpected event) on different neighborhoods.
Home ownership is typically very low among Muslim minorities. In 2002,
owner-occupied housing was 57 percent among the ethnic Dutch in the Nether-
lands while for the Dutch-Moroccan it was 9 percent and for the Dutch-Turkish
it was 20 percent (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2005). In Amsterdam, those
figures are lower. For the whole of Amsterdam, home ownership is only 20% while
in the type I neighborhoods it is even smaller. We show that less than 5% of the
people who sold their house in a type I neighborhood had a Moroccan or Turk-
ish origin. Therefore, if house prices change in type I neighborhoods relatively
to type II neighborhoods, we interpret this as a change in the common attitude
towards type I neighborhoods and hence towards immigrants. We do find some
evidence that the share of Turkish and Moroccan sellers decreased and the share
of buyers increased relatively strongly in type I neighborhoods after the murder.
This suggests that segregation increased.
Our findings can be explained by a standard hedonic market model, i.e. Tin-
bergen (1956) or Rosen (1974). The price of a house is determined by many
attributes of which the composition of the neighborhood is just one. After the
murder and the media attention, the value of living in a type I neighborhood de-
creased relatively to living in a type II neighborhood for sufficiently many native
Dutch agents. Since the inhabitants of the type I neighborhoods have nothing
to do with the murder, one can interpret the drop in house prices as a negative
externality. Recent evidence from the Social and Cultural Planning Office of The
Netherlands (SCP, 2006) suggests that relatively few individuals actually experi-
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ence a change after the murder in their personal life but more than 80% believes
that the murder affects the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in the
Netherlands. Other studies have found that attitudes of the population towards
immigrants are strongly based on perceptions. For example, it is widely believed
that immigrants decrease wages and increase crime while there is often no or even
opposite evidence for those claims, see Butcher and Piehl (1998), Card (2005) and
Card et al. (2005). Glaeser (2005) shows that if some political groups have in-
terest in spreading hatred towards other groups and there are small incentives
to learn the truth, the hatred can be self-fulfilling. When house prices drop sub-
stantially, the incentives about learning the truth increase. However, house prices
also have a resale component which makes it less profitable to deviate from a
common-belief market equilibrium that values houses in type I neighborhoods
less than in type II neighborhoods even if one’s private value towards living in
type I neighborhoods have not changed. Furthermore, it is likely that agents have
to learn about the change in resale value which explains the decrease of relative
prices over time. Our results on the compositional changes in type I neighbor-
hoods after the murder suggest that the value of living in a type I neighborhood
was larger for Moroccan/ Turkish people than for native Dutch people. Either
because their preferences did not change but relative prices dropped in type I
neighborhoods or because they actually preferred to live among their peers after
the murder.
There are a number of papers that study the cost of terrorism and conflicts.
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) find substantial effects from the Basque terrorist
conflict on the Basque Country. Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) find weak evidence
that terrorism leads to less urbanization but they also argue that the causal link
is dubious. Enders and Sandler (1991) and Fleischer and Buccola (2002) study
the effect of terrorism on tourism and find mixed evidence. Abadie and Dermisi
(2006) find that the 9-11 events still have an impact on office prices in high rise
buildings in Chicago. Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) argue that besides the lower
life expectancy, Israel suffered a substantial drop in GDP per capita due to the
high defense expenses to reduce terrorism. Frey et al. (2006) survey the literature
on the economic impact of terror and claim that at the date they wrote their
survey, no study has undertaken the hedonic market approach that we do in this
paper.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that our paper also contributes to under-
standing the working of the housing market in general. In our duration analysis
we estimate a mixed proportional hazard model allowing for unobserved hetero-
geneity and find that the hazard first increases and then after two quarters grad-
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ually decreases. The increasing part can be explained by learning, non-sequential
search of the sellers (they wait until a number of buyers arrive) or the fact that
sellers become desperate after some time, see Albrecht et al. (2005). We do not
find evidence that the time it took to sell a house increased after the murder.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses our iden-
tification strategy and our empirical specification. Section 3 describes the data
and Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 examines other causes that might
be driving the results, while Section 6 gives a hedonic market explanation for our
findings and presents additional evidence on compositional shifts of the neigh-
borhoods. Section 7 concludes.
2 Identification and Empirical Specification
The most general empirical setup is to specify the list price as a function of
individual and neighborhood characteristics. Given that we are interested in the
neighborhood effects from a given point in time, such a specification allows for
including a cross term consisting of a type I dummy times a time effect. We use
the following formulation:
pit = α+ βxi + νJ(i) + µ(t) + λ(t)dJ(i) + ξi + εit, (1)
where pit is the logarithm of the list price of house i in week t. The function
J(i) maps the house into a particular neighborhood. The vector xi contains the
characteristics of the house, i.e. surface, the type (apartment, family home, etc.)
and additional characteristics, such as whether there is a garage attached to the
house. The variable νJ(i) is a neighborhood fixed effect. The function µ(t) contains
the time effects for all neighborhoods, while λ(t) is a function of the additional
time effects of the type I neighborhoods. The variable dJ(i) is a dummy variable
that equals one for a type I neighborhood and zero otherwise. The variable ξi
is a house fixed effect and εit is the residual term of house i in period t. For
now, we assume that the residual term is independent and identically distributed
with zero mean and variance equal to σ2. This is a strong assumption, since list
prices change very infrequently. We investigate the impact of this assumption
when presenting the results in Section 4.
For the remainder of our analysis we assume that there are K houses, T
periods and N different neighborhoods. The number of individual houses in a
neighborhood in a particular time period equals kjt.
This specification has been used in the literature before (see for example
Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) for a labor market example). By estimating
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equation (1), the estimated λ(t) would give the price effect over time of a house
being for sale in a type I neighborhood versus a type II neighborhood.
Although the specification of (1) fits well with existing approaches to panel
data in labor economics, in the case of house prices direct estimation is impossible
since there is no mobility of houses between neighborhoods. Unlike a worker and
his or her employment status, we cannot separate a house from its neighborhood,
i.e., it is not possible to separately identify a house and a neighborhood fixed
effect. One way to solve this problem is to take averages over the neighborhoods,
measuring the treatment effect on the average ask price by neighborhood.4 That
is also the approach we take in the rest of the paper which results in the following
equation for p∗jt, the average of the logarithm of the list price in neighborhood j
in period t
p∗jt = α+ βx
∗
jt + ν
∗
j + µ(t) + λ(t)dj + ε
∗
jt, (2)
where p∗jt is the average price per neighborhood, i.e.,
p∗jt =
1
Njt
∑
i∈Hj
xi · FSit, (3)
and
FSit =
{
1 if house i is for sale in period t
0 otherwise,
(4)
Hj = { i | house i belongs to neighborhood j } , (5)
Njt =
∑
i∈Hj
FSit. (6)
Likewise, x∗jt is the vector of average properties for houses in neighborhood j that
are for sale at time t:
x∗jt =
1
Njt
∑
i∈Hj
xiFSit, (7)
The unobserved neighborhood fixed effect in this specification, ν∗j includes both
the original neighborhood fixed effect νj as well as the average of the individual
4Another reason to take averages over neighborhoods is to reduce the impact of the inde-
pendence assumption of εit. As discussed in Section 5, house prices do not change on a weekly
basis and this implies a correlation between εit with λ(t) and µ(t). Taking averages reduces
this problem since the i.i.d. assumption of ε∗jt is easier to defend. Still, serial correlation is a
potential problem in our specification. We investigate this in Section 5 as well.
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fixed effects within a period and neighborhood. Note that it is assumed con-
stant over time and this implies that systematic compositional changes in the
unobserved fixed effects are not allowed in this specification. This is a neces-
sary assumption for identification of the model. We discuss the impact of this
independence assumption in Subsection 5.2.
An important choice to be made now is the specification of µ(t) and λ(t), which
measure the overall time effect, and type I neighborhood time effect, respectively.
A straightforward approach is to use a fixed effects model that allows µ(t) and
λ(t) to vary each period. This results in estimates for µ(t) and λ(t) for every
week in the sample, where the estimates of λ(t) after week 45 in 2004 measure
the weekly impact of the murder. However, such an approach complicates the
interpretation and typically leads to large standard errors. Hence, after doing the
fixed effects estimation for µ(t) and λ(t), we will assume a polynomial in terms of
t for both µ(t) and λ(t). The polynomials parameterize the neighborhood effects
in the affected and non-affected periods. Formally,
µ(t) = pi(t) + ω(t)d1t, (8)
λ(t) = ζ(t) + η(t)d1t, (9)
where pi(t), ω(t), ζ(t) and η(t) are polynomials in t, and d1t is a dummy variable
that is equal to one for weeks after the murder and zero otherwise. pi(t) measures
the overall time effect in all neighborhoods, and ω(t) the difference in time-
effect from the week of the murder onwards. ζ(t) measures the overall time effect
in type I-neighborhoods, while η(t) models the time varying effects in type I-
neighborhoods in the weeks after the murder. Hence, when ζ(t) equals zero, we
can interpret η(t) as the impact of the murder on the house prices in the type I
neighborhoods.
Even though we assume that the residual terms in equation (1) are indepen-
dent and identically distributed, estimation of (2) using standard fixed effects
is inefficient due to heteroskedasticity. There are two sources of heteroskedastic-
ity: first there are different absolute price levels per neighborhood, the number of
listed houses per neighborhood varies. Using logs reduces the first source while we
use generalized least squares to correct for the latter effect. Basically, we weight
neighborhoods by the inverse of the standard deviation of the dependent variable
so neighborhoods with many observations typically receive a larger weight than
neighborhoods with few observations.5
Note that our specification allows for possible learning effects. It is quite
likely that the market only gradually learns about how housing prices are af-
5Details of this method are provided upon request.
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fected. Hence, only comparing two stages (one before and one after the news was
announced) might understate the effect of the murder on market prices.
3 Data
The data are collected on a weekly basis from the largest online multi-listing
service in the Netherlands called Funda which contains more than 70% of the
supply of houses listed by real estate agents. This is the market share of the
largest Dutch association of real estate agents (NVM), which sponsors the Funda
website. For the Amsterdam region, it has a typical stock of 3700 houses for sale
in any given week.
The start of our period of analysis is week 17 of 2004 and the end of our period
is week 6 of 2006 (the murder was in week 45 of 2004). For every house we collect
the address, zip code, the posted price (ask price), the surface of the house and
other features (like a garage) that may increase the value of the house. In addition
we have information on whether the house is conditionally sold.6 The posted
price of the house represents the ask price by the seller and there are no legal
restrictions in the Netherlands concerning this price and the characteristics that
are posted at the website. Even though this may be interpreted as an important
drawback of our analysis, there are no advantages for real-estate agents of giving
inaccurate information on easily observable characteristics of the house because
buyers always view the house before buying.
In order to investigate whether the price and/or the surface of a house differs
from the actual price and surface, we use additional data from the Netherlands’
Cadastre and Public Register Agency (Kadaster). This is a public agency that
registers and sells the actual selling prices of all houses. Our data set contains all
houses sold in the years 2004 and 2005 in Amsterdam. The number of observa-
tions equals 16,384. Although for about 50% of the houses we have an indication
about the week in which the conditional contract is signed (which is the date of
agreement on the price), we are not able to verify this information as the Kadaster
only registers the date at which the ownership of the house changes. Usually the
house changes hands a couple of months after the actual date of agreement, but
it is not uncommon that this takes more time. Hence, many of the houses at the
end of our observation window may not have been registered as being sold in
2005.
We identify the date at which a house enters the market as the date it first
6Conditionally sold implies that the buyer and seller arranged a contract but that the buyer
still has the possibility to cancel the transaction due to financial incapabilities.
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appears on the Funda website. In our main analysis we identify the date a house
leaves the market as the first week it does no longer appear at the website,
conditionally on the observation that it does not re-appear. This implies that
we do not take account of the additional information on whether the house is
conditionally sold. The problem with the latter variable is that different real-
estate agents use different strategies regarding the information that they provide
to potential buyers. Some real estate agents do not provide this information since
it might discourage bidders and these can be useful at the moment the transaction
is canceled. It can be found that only 50 percent of the houses disappear from
the website with an intermediate period in which it is conditionally sold. This
is in contrast with common practice that private buyers of residential properties
always use conditions in their contract. In addition, it is not uncommon that the
buyer uses its right to cancel the transaction. We find that in 7 percent of the cases
the house appears to be not sold after Funda reported it to be conditionally sold.
Finally, we do not expect that our results are affected by the different definitions
of the period at which a house is for sale since the average time the house is
conditionally sold is relatively short. We find that the medium period in which
the house is reported to be sold conditional on the event that this is reported
equals 6 weeks. We expect this number to be an overestimate of the medium for
all houses, since agents might be more likely to report the sold status when the
contracted period is relatively long. We investigate this in our robustness checks
in section 5.
We have 328,711 price observations in the raw data set of which 328,449 are
usable (48 prices were either below 10,000 or above 10,000,000 euro and 214
observations did not report surface). These price observations are recorded from
20,743 different houses (of which 6 turned out not to be usable). Table 1 lists the
averages of the main variables that we use.
We linked the information about individual houses from the Funda website
with neighborhood information from the statistics council in Amsterdam. In to-
tal there are 90 neighborhoods in Amsterdam which have residential property for
sale. A typical neighborhood has 8,000 inhabitants. The most important neigh-
borhood information that we use is the ethnic origin of the residents. As men-
tioned in the Introduction, we label neighborhoods as type I when the fraction
of Turkish and Moroccan inhabitants exceeds 25%, the other neighborhoods are
labeled type II.7 We have in total 12 type I and 88 type II neighborhoods. Ta-
ble 1 shows that the average price of a house in type I neighborhoods is around
180,000 euro. This is much lower than the average house price of 325,000 euro
7The fraction of other Muslim immigrants is negligible.
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in the type II neighborhoods. We find that this can be partly explained by the
observed characteristics of the houses, which are more favorable for the type II
neighborhoods: the houses in type I neighborhoods are smaller, more likely to
be an apartment and less likely to have a garage. Houses are listed on average
20 weeks on the website in both types of neighborhoods. Not surprisingly, the
income per head is much lower in the type I neighborhoods than in the type II
neighborhoods. Finally we find that the crime rates, defined as the number of
registered crimes divided by the number of individuals within the neighborhood,
are lowest in the type I neighborhoods. This goes against the common percep-
tions since neighborhoods with many immigrants are usually believed to be more
criminal.8 Our findings are in line with earlier research by Card (2005).
In order to obtain some ideas about the development of house prices in the
two types of neighborhoods, Figure 2 shows the relative house prices per square
footage. After the murder, houses in type 1 neighborhoods were slightly larger
than before. This is also reflected in Figure 3, which illustrates the development of
square footage over the observation window. Looking at the development in Fig-
ure 2 we find that the house prices were stable in the first half of 2004 while they
increased strongly in the type II neighborhoods after that period. One potential
reason for this strong increase is that the interest rates decreased a lot during
this period. We investigate this in our empirical analysis in the next section.
Since we look at the differences in house prices between the type I and type
II neighborhoods it is important that the ask price correctly reflects the situation
at the housing market. If however, prices only adjust slowly, big changes in the
inflow and outflow over time may occur just after the murder took place. This is
not the case. Figure 4 shows the development of the number of houses that are
posted for the first time in a given week. These figures do not indicate a large
impact of the murder on the number of houses for sale over the period of analysis.
4 The Effect of the Murder on House Prices in
Amsterdam
4.1 Linear and Quadratic Trends
We use a constant, linear and quadratic approximation of λ(t) for all the empirical
exercises in this paper. Our baseline results are in Table 2 and Figures 6 to 8.
We include the fixed effects estimation of equation (2) in these figures in order
to show the quality of our approximation methods. The first column of Table 2
8Many of the drug-related crimes take place in the more expensive touristic neighborhoods.
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shows the results when using a constant term. We find a significant negative price
effect of 1.1 percent on the house prices in type I neighborhoods, see Figure 6.
As the fixed effects estimates in Figure 6 suggest, this is not due to a once and
for all decrease. Column 2 of Table 2 shows the estimation results for the linear
model, i.e., the parameters of the linear approximation to λ(t). It shows that the
development of house prices can be described quite well with a linear relationship.
The impact is between 0.1 to 0.2 percent per week after the murder of Van Gogh
and reaches a high of 3 percent a year after the murder. This suggests that there
are either menu costs or there is a learning process in the market. We investigate
this further in Subsection 4.2. Since house prices in type I neighborhoods were
increasing before the murder and decreasing afterwards we believe that the trend
effect is more informative than the constant effect.9
The results are visualized in Figure 7. In the third column of Table 2, we
see that the estimates for a second degree polynomial are less precise. However,
the parameters of the polynomial after the murder are still jointly significantly
different from zero for both models, as the Wald statistics show. See Figure 8
for a graph of the results for the quadratic model. The estimation results for
the control variables are as expected. The price of a house is increasing with
size. Apartments and flats have a lower selling price than complete houses, while
having a garage has a positive impact.
4.2 Sticky List Prices
An important assumption is that εit, the error term in equation (2), is independent
across individual houses as well as over time for a single house. Together with the
trend effects µ(t) and λ(t), the time-independence effect implies that prices of a
single house can change every period. This is counterfactual since 70 percent of
the listed houses never had a single price change. Table 5 gives more details and
indicates that there is a strong relationship between the duration that a house is
listed and the likelihood that the price is changed. This suggests that list prices
are sticky, and that the disturbance term in (1), on which model (2) is based, is
not independent over time.
To examine the potential impact of sticky list prices, consider a model that
takes ‘menu costs’ into account. ‘Menu costs’ is the term used for costs associated
with a change in the public price of a good, see Mankiw (1985). Whatever the
nature of these costs, monetary or non-monetary, direct or indirect, the presence
9Imagine that the treatment effects increase in each of the n weeks before the treatment
and decrease in each of the n weeks after the treatment till the original level. Only looking at
a constant would make one conclude that there is no effect.
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of costs makes sellers reluctant to change the listed price immediately in response
to a change in the market price of the house. To model such an effect, define p˙it
as the logarithm of the market price of house i in period t and assume the same
specification for this house as in equation (1). In addition, denote the listed price
by pit, and let ρ be an arbitrary constant. We have
pit = α+ βxi + νJ(i) + µ(t˜(t)) + λ(t˜(t))dJ(i) + ξi + εit˜(t)
where t˜(t) is the time period of the last price change which is defined as
t˜(t+ 1) =
{ t˜(t) if (∣∣∣Pit − P˙it∣∣∣ < ρ)
(t+ 1) if
(∣∣∣Pit − P˙it∣∣∣ ≥ ρ)
Sellers only change their prices if the difference between the actual and the desired
price is sufficiently large. If this is the case, then the price is updated towards
the present market price. Note that the model is identical to our original model
when ρ = 0, whereas ρ = ∞ results in a model in which sellers never adjust their
prices.
Now the question is whether this may cause potential problems when we
want to use our model instead of the extended model presented here. Of course,
estimation of equation (1) results in inconsistent estimates due to the correlation
between the error term and the trend effects. However, we do not estimate this
equation but instead estimate (2), using the averages over a neighborhood in
a single period. Then, as long as there is no change in the composition of the
durations of a single neighborhood over time, there is no correlation between the
error term and the trend effects.
Still, it may be possible that a downward price shock in a neighborhood
(like the murder) leads to no, or only small changes in the list price, and a
longer duration of the time to sale. This may be caused by adaptive learning,
or the reluctance of sellers to adjust the list price downwards due to nominal
loss aversion, see Genesove and Mayer (2001). The possible duration effect is
examined in Subsection 5.4, but first we consider a correction based on taking
only list prices of houses in the first week that they appear online. Although
the same problems as above may apply here, because sellers might be slow to
adjust their expectations of the sales price to market developments, the effect
will at least be less severe. Again, we exclude all houses listed before week 17
in 2004 (since these houses do not have records on the attachment of a garage),
which leaves us with 11,951 observations. The results of the estimation with only
first-week prices are given in Table 6.
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The results in Table 6 show that using first-week list prices does not have
a big impact on our results. The overall effects in the constant specification in-
crease to 1.3 percent, compared to 1.1% in the baseline estimation. For the linear
specification we find an increase in the weekly loss in house prices.
4.3 Leaving out Expensive Neighborhoods
The assumption underlying the neighborhood equation (2) is that the trend in
list prices of houses in type I and type II neighborhoods share a common trend,
µ(t). Under this assumption, the price difference after the murder, measured by
λ(t), correctly measures the structural price difference in the period after the Van
Gogh murder. However, one might argue that type I and type II neighborhoods
are so different in type of housing that it is hard to justify the existence of a
common trend. Perhaps the two types of neighborhoods are separate housing
markets that are each influenced by completely different factors.
We study the impact of this problem by restricting the neighborhoods used for
the analysis to those with an average net yearly income per head below 20,000
euros. Using a threshold value of 20,000 euros leaves out the more expensive
neighborhoods near the centre and southern area of Amsterdam and gives a
better justification to view all neighborhoods as belonging to a single Amsterdam
housing market. The total number of neighborhoods is now equal to 59 with the
number of type I neighborhoods still equal to 12. The yearly income per household
is equal to 16,302 euros in type II neighborhoods, practically equal to the 16,408
euros for type I neighborhoods. Estimation results are reported in Table 7. The
results in the Table 7 show that the estimate using the constant term is -1.3
percent, an even larger decrease than the -1.1 percent found for the estimation
with all neighborhoods in Table 2. The linear specification has a larger absolute
value of the constant term but a slightly lower value of the linear coefficient.
Taking a control group that is more similar to the treatment group thus gives
very similar results.
4.4 The effect in terms of the fraction of Muslims in a
neighborhood
The type I and type II neighborhoods were defined as having a percentage of Turk-
ish and Moroccan inhabitants either above (type I) or below (type II) a threshold
level. However, we can also use the information on the percentage Turkish or Mo-
roccan per neighborhood directly, by including them in the estimation. I.e., we
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can rewrite equation 2 as
p∗jt = α+ βx
∗
jt + ν
∗
j + µ(t) + λ(t)γ(s) + ε
∗
jt, (10)
where s is the percentage of Turkish and Moroccan originated immigrants and γ is
a function of s. The original specification is a special case of this representation
with γ being a step function that jumps from zero to one when s exceeds 25
percent.
Using a polynomial representation for γ, Table 8 shows that a higher density
of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants increases the impact of the murder. With
a positive second order term, the impact is less than linear. Table 9 presents the
results when we use a piecewise constant specification rather than a polynomial.
We find that the negative impact on the trend term is especially relevant when
the percentage of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants increases from below 10
to above 10 percent. For higher percentages it stays stable up to 30 percent. It
increases again above 30 percent. In order to illustrate the impact of the results
listed in 8 and 9, we present the total impact after 13, 26 and 52 weeks in Figures
12, 13 and 14. We find that the patterns do not change that much from each
other, but the total impact increases over time. Remarkable is the fact that the
total impact after 52 weeks is much larger than we found before.
4.5 Withdrawals
Not all houses that are removed from the listing service get the status “conditional
sale” before disappearing. Private observations tell us that some real estate agents
just don’t do this when selling a house. However, some house are delisted without
being sold, which might distort the dependent variable in our model. To see if it is
of influence, Table 10 presents the estimation results using only houses that have
gotten the label “conditional sale” before disappearing from the website. We find
that the constant effect, -0.8 percent, is slightly smaller than the 1.1 percent of
the baseline estimation while the linear coefficient is now twice as large. At this
point we can conclude that our general result that there was a relative drop in
house prices in type I neighborhoods is robust but that with different definitions
of the control group or selling date, the constant might be slightly smaller and
the linear effects slightly larger (and vice versa).
4.6 Serial Correlation
As indicated in the introduction, our method does not suffer from many of the
problems related to the use of difference-in-difference estimations. However, given
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that the list price of a house does not change frequently, it is likely that the error
term in the specification of p∗jt in (2) will be serially correlated. I.e., a large
neighborhood mis-pricing (in terms of the specification in (2)) in one period is
likely to carry over to the next period.
Betrand et al. (2004) point out that the standard errors from simple difference-
in-difference estimators can be biased when the number of periods is long, the
dependent variable is likely to suffer from serial correlation and the treatment
variable changes very little over time. Unfortunately, our analysis is potentially
sensitive to all these factors. Therefore, it is important to investigate the possible
impact of serial correlation on the standard errors of the estimates of λ(t).
One possible way to correct for this is by using block bootstraps as suggested
in Bertrand et al. (2004). Unfortunately, this method only works when the panel
is balanced. In order to correct for this we use a balanced panel in our analysis,
dropping those neighborhoods with fewer observations than time periods. This
results in dropping 12 of the 90 neighborhoods.
Table 15 lists the results of the block bootstrap exercise. We basically sample
neighborhood rows rather than time/neighborhood cells to obtain the empirical
distribution of estimates and the ”correct” t-values at the 5% level. The first three
rows list the t-values when we drop the 12 neighborhoods. There are some small
changes in comparison with the original results. In particular, the trend term in
the second column has a lower t-value than for the original results in Table 2. The
rows below list the critical values found by the block bootstrap exercise. In the
first column, we find that the critical values are much higher in absolute terms
than those of a standard normal distribution. This suggests a big impact of serial
correlation in the original results. Nevertheless, our conclusions are not affected
since the estimated t-value is still higher than the critical t-values as listed in the
table.
The second column suggests that the changes in critical values for the t−values
are smaller. In addition, we find that our conclusions are again not affected.
5 Robustness and Extensions
Although the estimation results clearly indicate a price effect taking place after
the murder, it is still possible that other effects than the Van Gogh murder are
driving the results. Demand and supply factors unrelated to the Van Gogh murder
might impact the relative prices of houses in type II neighborhoods vis-a`-vis the
houses in type I neighborhoods. Probably the most important demand factor
is the mortgage interest rate while on the supply side the characteristics of the
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houses for sale in both neighborhoods are important.
In this section we also present two extensions to analyze whether the list price
differentials are accompanied by (i) changes in the average difference between list
price and transaction price, and (ii) changes in the time on the market of listed
houses.
5.1 Mortgage Interest Rates
It is possible that the reported effect is caused by house prices reacting to interest
rate changes. Figure 9 illustrates the development of these interest rates during
our observation window. We find that the interest rates are rather stable before
the date of the murder, but decrease quite sharply the months following the
murder.
In order to investigate the possible source of bias in our results due to different
impacts of the interest rate on house prices in the two types of neighborhoods, we
proceed by using a multiple step estimation procedure. First, we estimate the fixed
effects model as represented in for example Figure 6. Next, we regress the fixed
effects on a flexible specification of the mortgage interest rates. The residuals of
this regression can be interpreted as the impact of the murder after the difference
in impacts of the interest rates between the neighborhoods have been taken out.
As a final step we regress the residuals on a polynomial over time and in order
to investigate the impact of the murder we allow for interaction effects with the
date of the murder. Note that this procedure is very conservative in the sense
that we prefer the interest rate explanation above the murder explanation in the
analysis of the possible change in house prices between neighborhoods. It implies
that the interest rate can pick up some effects of the murder but it is impossible
that the murder can pick up some effects of the changes in the interest rate.
An alternative would be to use the interest rates in equation (2) and report the
difference-and-difference estimates directly. We found that this procedure did not
produce different results from the baseline analysis.
The results of our regression of the fixed effects on the mortgage interest rates
are reported in Table 3. The coefficients of this Table are somewhat difficult
to interpret. In general, a minus sign implies that the house prices in type I
neighborhoods are more sensitive to mortgage interest rate changes and a positive
sign implies the opposite. However, the inclusion of multiple interest rates and the
high level of multicollinearity between these regressors makes the interpretation
difficult. The residuals of this regression are reported in Figure 10.
The results of the final step are listed in Table 4. We find that the single
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coefficient in the constant specification does not differ significantly from zero
which implies that on average house prices in the type I neighborhoods did not
decrease after the murder but again, this might be due to the fact that the interest
rate picks up some of the murder-effect. Moreover, as we argued before the trend
effect is more informative and we still find a negative and significant impact over
time for both the linear and quadratic specification.
5.2 Compositional changes in the supply of houses
Our main identifying assumption is that the house fixed effects are independently
distributed within a neighborhood through time. This implies that the unob-
served characteristics of houses for sale within a neighborhood do not change
in any systematic way. This assumption may be violated when proportionally
more ill-maintained houses enter the market in a particular neighborhood. For
our analysis this is a potential problem when it is occurs simultaneously with
the date of the murder, which would lead us to mistakenly take a composition
change of the houses before and after the murder as a change in house prices.10
One way to check the validity of our identifying assumption is by looking at the
observed characteristics of the type I and type II neighborhoods and compare the
development before and after the murder. With respect to the most important
component: surface, we do not find that the average quality of houses for sale
decreased in type I neighborhoods, see Figure 3. Note that surface and neighbor-
hood together explain 80% of the variance in house prices. We therefore conclude
that the composition of houses for sale in type I and type II neighborhoods did
not change after the murder.
5.3 Changes in the Average Markup
An additional check on house price effects around the Van Gogh murder is to use
actual transaction prices. To this end, we purchased data from the ‘Kadaster’,
the official register for residential property ownership and transactions in The
Netherlands. The data provided gives the transaction price of all house transac-
tions in Amsterdam for the year 2004-2005. We merge our data set with the data
set of the register by street address and zip code, taking only those houses from
the register that have appeared on Funda. Also, we deleted some of the matches
that had either a remarkably low transaction price or a large deviation between
10This situation would also indicate that something happened in the type I neighborhoods
after the murder. However, these effects differ from our interpretation.
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list price and transaction price.11 We were able to match 10,479 out of 16,384
of the houses recorded to be sold in the period 2004-2005. Apart from our own
removal of some awkward houses, there are a number of reasons why we were not
able to match all houses: (i) the house was sold by an agent outside the NVM
organization that is behind Funda or sold without being listed on Funda, (ii)
the house was sold before February 2004, the start of the Funda data set, (iv)
real-estate agents may have misspelled the street address when it comes to the
addendum to the house number. In all, the houses listed on Funda account for
60% of all houses sold in Amsterdam in the period 2004-2005.
Some of the reasons listed above also hold for this data set but in addition
to this, many of the unmatched houses were listed at the end of our observation
window. This implies that these houses were not yet sold in 2005, which is the
end of the observation window for the registered database.
The average differences between house prices in the final week that the house
is listed on Funda and the actual transaction price are reported in Table 12. The
list prices presented are lower than those in Table 1 because here we only take
the price in the final week of listing, whereas Table 1 considers the list prices for
all houses in the weeks that they are listed. Also, the houses that are matched
have a slightly lower house price than those we were not able to match. The
mean transaction price for all recorded transactions is 285,213 euros. The entry
‘discount’ in Table 12 represents the percentage difference between the finally
posted and the transaction price, and is 4.17% for all houses, 3.82% for houses in
type I neighborhoods, and 4.23% for type II houses. In addition, the correlation
between posted and transaction price is over 99%, implying that the list price is
a good representation of the ultimate transaction price.
Figure 16 displays the level of the average discount per neighborhood over
time. As can bee seen in the Figure, there is a sharp increase in the average
discount for houses in type I neighborhoods right after the week of the Van Gogh
murder. This effect is in line with the ‘menu costs’ hypothesis, i.e., list prices
do not drop immediately although market (transaction) prices do. Using the
difference-in-difference estimate of this increase we find a point estimate of 1.4
percent with a standard deviation of 1.2 percent. Hence, even though the increase
in the markup seems large, it is not significant.
11The houses we deleted had a selling price under 10,000 euros and we deleted the matches
with deviations over 30 percent of the selling price. In total we deleted about 3 percent of the
dataset.
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5.4 Duration analysis
We have established a persistent negative price effect between type I and type
II neighborhoods after the week of the Van Gogh murder. However, as noted in
Section 4.2, the number of weeks it takes for a house to be sold gives additional
information on the effect of the murder on the housing market. To test for dura-
tion effects, we use a mixed proportional hazard model with both duration and
time dependence, see Van den Berg (2001). Let θ(t, τ, x, v) be the (hazard) rate at
which houses are sold. In this notation, t is the duration in weeks that the house
is on the multi-listing service, τ is calendar time as measured in weeks starting
from the first week of 2004. The vector x represents the observed characteristics
of the house, just as in the earlier price equation (1).12 The variable v represents
the unobserved characteristics of the house. We use the following specification for
the hazard rate
θ(ti, τi, xi, v) = exp
(
xβ + νJ(i)γ1(τi) + γ2(τ)d)ψ(ti)
)
ui
where νj is a neighborhood fixed effect and, as before, J(i) maps a house i to its
neighborhood j = J(i). The function γ1 represents the overall time effect, while γ2
represents the additional effect for houses in type I neighborhoods. The function ψ
represents the duration dependence. For all functions we use a piecewise constant
specification, see Lancaster (1990). We use a fixed mass point distribution for the
stochastic variable ui and assume it to be independent and identically distributed
among the observations. Since all houses that are for sale in the first week of the
sample period are left-censored with respect to duration, we only include newly
arrived houses after the first week of the sample period.
Estimation results for the mixed proportional hazard specification are listed
in Table 11. As before, we do not list the levels of the neighborhood fixed effects.
First of all, Table 11 shows that larger houses, apartments and houses with a
garage attached sell faster. Houses have a relatively small probability to be sold
in the first four weeks, while the highest probability to sell a house is in between
weeks 9 and 13. In the second quarter the probability decreases somewhat but it
is never as low as it is in the first four weeks. This indicates that sellers need some
time to advertise their property or that sellers become more impatient when the
12We choose not to include price itself in our analysis since we expect this variable to be
correlated with the unobserved characteristics. There have been a number of attempts to correct
for this (for example Rutherford et al. (2005), but these methods are not suitable for the present
analysis. In our opinion only a full information maximum likelihood approach with the inclusion
of a price and duration equation would solve this problem. However, such a method is more
restrictive in terms of parameters.
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house is already for sale for more than one month, see Albrecht et al. (2005). It
also indicates that learning effects are important since even if a seller gets many
offers from potential buyers in the first quarter (s)he may not sell the house
because it may signal that the house is of good quality. Only after sellers learn
about the quality of the house they start to accept bids of potential buyers.
An important result in Table 11 is that u1 = 0, which means that unobserved
heterogeneity is negligible.
The possible impact of the murder can be found by comparing the cross effects
of time and type I neighborhoods in the quarters before and after the murder.
This shows that after the Van Gogh murder, there is no significant increase in the
expected time to sell a house in type I versus type II neighborhoods. To show how
the probabilities of selling a house are related, Figure 15 shows the development
of the hazard rate, scaled as the probability to sell the house in the first week
of listing. The probabilities for type I neighborhoods are always below those of
type II neighborhoods. In addition, the probabilities are increasing over time for
all neighborhoods, with a larger increase for type I neighborhoods. However, we
should take into account that the standard errors of the difference, i.e., the time
effects times the type I neighborhood effects in Table 11, are large.
Note that the present literature on the duration of house sales usually assumes
a Weibull distribution for the baseline hazard of the mixed proportional hazards
model, see Rutherford et al. (2005) and Zuehlke (1987). For example, Zuehlke
concludes that there is no duration dependence for occupied houses while there
is positive duration dependence for vacant houses. A drawback of the use of
a Weibull baseline hazards specification is that we cannot allow for duration
dependence other than duration dependence that is monotonic, see Lancaster
(1990). We find in our analysis that the duration dependence is not monotonic,
so the use of a Weibull distribution would be inappropriate.
5.5 Effect on the Variance of List Prices
In the preceding sections we investigated the impact of the Van Gogh murder on
the average list prices. However, it is quite possible that also the variance of list
prices changed during this period owing to increased uncertainty. We replicated
our main analysis using the variance of the house price instead of the mean.
The results of this exercise are summarized in Figure 17. Surprisingly we find
that the variance in the type I neighborhoods decreased compared to the type II
neighborhoods. In addition we find that this decrease already started before the
murder. We therefore conclude that market uncertainty did not increase after the
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murder.
6 How Did the Murder Impact House Prices?
The following story is consistent with our results. The murder of Theo van Gogh
and all the related media attention decreased the willingness of native Dutch
buyers and sellers to live in type 1 neighborhoods. This resulted in a lower equi-
librium price. Since house prices have a large resale component, the price drop also
reflects the expected preference shift of future buyers and sellers. The decrease
of relative prices over time suggests that there was learning going on about this
resale component. Below we discuss some direct evidence that the public believed
that the murder had an impact on attitudes towards Muslims.
Direct evidence on the attitudes about Muslims and the relation between
Moroccan and Turkish Dutch vis-a-vis native Dutch citizens is given by the LIS
(Living situation non-native city inhabitants) questionnaire which was (by co-
incidence) held in the week after the murder and some questions related to the
murder were added, see SCP (2006). Part of the questionnaire concerns the at-
titude shifts after the murder. Of the native Dutch respondents, 33% personally
thinks differently about the relation between Muslims and non-Muslims after the
murder while 86% believes that the murder will have an effect on the relation-
ship between Muslims and non-Muslims. Only 5% believes that the murder will
have an effect on themselves or their family. The latter fraction is a lot larger
under Moroccans (20%) and Turkish (13%) Dutch inhabitants. Thus the survey
suggests that the murder had an impact on the overall expected attitude of non-
Muslims towards Muslims. This then, is the effect that is translated directly into
the housing market: a potential buyer is not just valuing the direct benefits that
follow from owning the house, but also takes into account the resale value, which
depends on the preferences of future buyers.
We expect that Muslims value type I neighborhoods after the murder higher
than the native Dutch either because their preferences did not change but rela-
tive prices did drop or because the desire to cluster together with other Muslims
increased. This can be tested. Since the register agency does not provide the ex-
plicit ethnicity of the parties involved in a sale, we have to rely on the surnames
of buyer and seller to identify whether either one of them is of Turkish or Moroc-
can origin. For this, we had assistants from both cultures that checked if a name
was typical for their country of origin. Tables 13 and 14 provide the results in
terms of the fraction of transactions that involves a Turkish or Moroccan buyer
or seller, both before and after the murder.
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Table 13 shows that in type I neighborhoods, the net inflow of Turkish/Moroccan
dwellers changed from about 3% (8.12 - 5.14) of all transactions before the mur-
der to 6% (9.87-3.75) after the murder. In type II neighborhoods, the changes
are a lot smaller, (an increase in net flow from 1% to 1.6%). In addition, the
small percentages of buyers and sellers from a non-Dutch origin indicate that
the changes in house prices are mainly driven by changes in the preferences of
Dutch rather than Turkish or Moroccan homeowners. Summing up, we find some
evidence that segregation increased. The fraction of Moroccan/Turkish buyers
increased and the fraction sellers decreased after the murder.
There are many idiosyncratic shocks which cause people to either buy or sell
a house like family or labor market changes. On average they will not affect the
market price but they do influence the number of transactions. The murder of
Theo van Gogh was more of an aggregate shock which did not cancel out across
households and therefore did affect prices. The number of people that changed
houses because of this shock just appeared to be small relative to those who move
because of idiosyncratic reasons.
7 Conclusions
The economic impact of terrorism is in general difficult to measure. In this paper
we take an hedonic-market approach and show that after the Murder of film
maker and journalist Theo van Gogh, house prices in neighborhoods with more
than 25% Muslims decreased with about 0.1 to 0.2 percent per week relatively
to the other neighborhoods in Amsterdam. After about a year, the difference
in trends stops and market sentiments cool down. On average, the price drop is
about 1.5 percent while after ten months it is 3 percent. Those results turn out to
be robust to many different specifications in the sense that house prices in type
I neighborhoods decreased on average and over time although the relative size of
the constant and the linear term changes with different definitions of selling dates
and control groups. We do not find evidence that the time it takes to sell a house
in those neighborhoods increased relatively to our control neighborhoods after the
murder. Finally, our results suggest that segregation increased a bit. ¿From the
work of Schelling (1969) we know that small changes at the micro level in terms
of preferences about neighborhood composition can lead to complete segregation.
It is however too early to draw any conclusions about whether this will happen.
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Appendix A: Tables and Figures
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
This table gives the descriptive statistics of the list prices collected. ‘Sold’ is
the variable that signals whether a house is conditionally sold. The crime rate
per neighborhood is derived from the Amsterdam statistics council and defined
as the number of registered crimes. The mean crime rate is computed over the
neighborhood population.
Variable Number of observations Mean Standard Deviation
All neighborhoods
Number of neighborhoods 90
List price 20148 290487 236261
Apartment 20148 0.85
Surface in square footage 20148 1050 655
Garage attached 18475 0.028
Sold 23656 0.177
Surface (area) 6557 1153 2281
Duration listed 20148 20.36 18.71
Income per individual in neighborhood 20148 20471 4459
Crime rate in neighborhood 20148 0.148 0.268
Type I neighborhoods
Number of neighborhoods 12
Price 2497 175732 56533
Apartment 2497 0.93
Surface in square footage 2497 804.6 265.4
Garage attached 2278 0.018
Surface (area) 817 958 2347
Duration listed 2278 20.83 20.34
Income per individual in neighborhood 2278 16480 918
Crime rate in neighborhood 2278 0.087 0.014
Type II neighborhoods
Number of neighborhoods 78
Price 17651 306721 247260
Apartment 17651 0.839
Surface in square footage 17651 1084 686
Garage attached 16197 0.029
Surface (area) 5740 1181 2271
Duration listed 17651 20.16 17.92
Income per individual in neighborhood 17651 21037 4472
Crime rate in neighborhood 17651 0.157 0.285
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Table 2: Baseline results
This table shows the baseline results for the price effects of the Theo van
Gogh murder. The first column lists the estimation results for the specification
of λ(t) = c. The second and third column list the estimation results for the
linear and quadratic specification, respectively. Panel A gives the difference-in-
difference estimates. Panel B to D show the estimation results for the general
price effect before the murder, before the murder in type I neighborhoods, and
after the murder. The variables η, pi, ζ, and ω refer to the variables defined in
Equation (8).
I II III
A: Difference-in-difference estimators
Constant -0.0113 -0.0030 -0.0101
(0.00201) (0.00382) (0.00560)
t · -0.0013 -0.0023
(0.00020) (0.00078)
t2 (x 100) · · -0.0047
(0.00256)
Other results
B: Results before the murder
Constant 11.6299 11.6289 11.6300
(0.02281) (0.02286) (0.02281)
t (x 100) · -0.0000 -0.0002
(0.00007) (0.00024)
t2 · · 0.0006
(0.00087)
C: Results before the murder, type I neighborhoods
t · 0.0006 -0.0005
(0.00019) (0.00068)
t2 (x 100) · · 0.0044
(0.00250)
D: results after the murder
Constant 0.0259 0.0007 -0.0012
(0.00070) (0.00134) (0.00196)
t · 0.0010 0.0009
(0.00007) (0.00027)
t2 (x 100) · · -0.0009
(0.00089)
Control variables
Surface 0.0924 0.0933 0.0933
(0.0011) (0.00108) (0.00108)
Surface2 (x 1000) -0.011 -0.012 -0.012
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Apartment -0.1067 -0.1144 -0.1141
(0.0070) (0.0068) (0.0069)
Garage 0.1087 0.0840 0.0832
(0.0136) (0.0132) (0.0132)
Goodness of fit measures
R2 within 0.6521 0.6707 0.6708
R2 between 0.8154 · ·
R2 overall 0.8324 0.8362 0.8367
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Table 3: Regression of fixed effects on the mortgage interest rates
Variable Estimate
Constant -0.6460
(0.0696)
Logarithm of the interest rate
Up to 1 year 0.2731
(0.0479)
Between 5 and 10 years -0.9538
(0.1782)
Over 10 years 0.8358
(0.098)
Logarithm of the interest rate - One pe-
riod lagged
Between 5 and 10 years 0.2905
( 0.1507)
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Table 4: Results taking account of different impacts of the development
in mortgage interest rates.
I II III
Difference-in-difference estimators
Constant 0.0019 -0.0026 -0.0117
(0.0016) (0.0026) (0.0038)
t (x100) -0.0891 -0.2541
(0.014) (0.0543)
t2 (x100) -0.0070
(0.0018)
Other results
Results before the murder
Constant -0.0013 -0.0233 0.0386
(0.0013) (0.0042) (0.0171)
t (x100) -0.0698 -0.3507
(0.0129) (0.1134)
t2 (x100) 0.0067
(0.0018)
27
Table 5: List price changes
For each interval in weeks of the duration of the house, this table give the
number of houses and the percentage of houses that experience a change in
list price during the time of listing.
Duration Number of observations Percentage price change
1-5 weeks 2970 25.9
5-10 weeks 4097 5.9
10-15 weeks 2961 16.1
15-20 weeks 2182 27.4
20-25 weeks 1558 40.2
25-30 weeks 1270 51.7
30-35 weeks 761 54.5
35-40 weeks 458 61.6
40-45 weeks 342 64.6
45-50 weeks 263 73.4
50-55 weeks 1030 72.3
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Table 6: Using only first-week list prices
This table shows the baseline results for the neighborhood-effects of the Theo
van Gogh murder using only the list prices in the first week that a house is listed.
The first column lists the estimation results for the specification of λ(t) = c. The
second and third column list the estimation results for the linear and quadratic
specification, respectively. Panel A gives the difference-in-difference estimates.
Panel B to D show the estimation results for the general price effect before the
murder, before the murder in type I neighborhoods, and after the murder. The
variables η, pi, ζ, and ω refer to the variables defined in Equation (8).
I II III
A: Difference-in-difference estimators
Constant -0.013 -0.001 -0.001
( 0.004) ( 0.008) ( 0.011)
t · -0.005 -0.012
( 0.002) ( 0.007)
t2 · · -0.001
( 0.001)
Other results
B: Results before the murder
Constant 11.678 11.687 11.687
( 0.023) ( 0.024) ( 0.023)
t · 0.000 -0.001
( 0.001) ( 0.002)
t2 · · 0.000
( 0.000)
C: Results before the murder, type I neighborhoods
t · 0.003 -0.002
( 0.002) ( 0.006)
t2 · · 0.001
( 0.001)
D: Results after the murder
Constant 0.031 -0.000 -0.005
( 0.001) ( 0.003) ( 0.004)
t · 0.004 0.004
( 0.001) ( 0.002)
t2 · · -0.000
( 0.000)
Control variables
Surface 0.001 0.001 0.001
( 0.000) ( 0.000) ( 0.000)
Surface2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
( 0.000) ( 0.000) ( 0.000)
Apartment -0.159 -0.188 -0.186
( 0.014) ( 0.013) ( 0.013)
Garage 0.113 0.090 0.088
( 0.026) ( 0.025) ( 0.025)
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Table 7: Using only lower-income neighborhoods
This table shows the estimation results using only neighborhoods where the
yearly income per head is below 20,000 euro. The first column lists the estima-
tion results for the specification of λ(t) = c. The second and third column list
the estimation results for the linear and quadratic specification, respectively.
Panel A gives the diff-in-diff estimates. Panel B to D show the estimation re-
sults for the general price effect before the murder, before the murder in type I
neighborhoods, and after the murder. The variables η, pi, ζ, and ω refer to the
variables defined in Equation (8).
I II III
A: Difference-in-difference estimates
Constant -0.0134 -0.0054 -0.0124
(0.00241) (0.00466) (0.00685)
t · -0.0009 -0.0015
(0.00025) (0.00096)
t2 (x 100) · · -0.0038
(0.00314)
Other results
B: Results before the murder
Constant 11.5249 11.5344 11.5393
(0.02316) (0.02332) (0.02328)
t (x 100) · 0.0003 -0.0003
(0.00011) (0.00040)
t2 · · 0.0022
(0.00147)
C: Results before the murder, type I neighborhoods
t · 0.0004 -0.0004
(0.00023) (0.00084)
t2 (x 100) · · 0.0032
(0.00307)
D: Results after the murder
Constant 0.0284 0.0034 0.0014
(0.00116) (0.00221) (0.00325)
t · 0.0006 -0.0001
(0.00012) (0.00046)
t2 (x 100) · · -0.0020
(0.00150)
E: Control variables
Surface 0.0999 0.0994 0.0992
(0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Surface2 (x 1000) -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Apartment -0.1541 -0.1705 -0.1714
(0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0094)
Garage -0.0053 -0.0155 -0.0165
(0.0193) (0.0190) (0.01906)
Goodness of fit measures
R2 within 0.6764 0.6825 0.6827
R2 between 0.7162 · ·
R2 overall 0.7747 0.7808 0.7819
Table 8: Minority percentages, polynomial
This table shows the same results as before, but with a direct estimate of the
impact of s, the fraction Musim population, on the price difference between
type I and type II neighborhoods. The variables s, s2, etc. refer to the order
of the polynomial used to model the relation the minority percentage and the
average list price per neighborhood.
I II III
Difference-in-difference estimates
s 0.0037 0.0074 0.0109
(0.00070) (0.00097) (0.00135)
s2 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0008
(0.00006) (0.00009) (0.00013)
s3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
s4 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
t × s (x 100) · -0.0173 -0.0614
(0.00268) (0.01061)
t × s2 (x 100) · 0.0009 0.0035
(0.00024) (0.00098)
t × s3 (x 100) · -0.0000 -0.0001
(0.00001) (0.00003)
t × s4 (x 100) · 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00000) (0.00000)
t2 × s (x 1000) · · 0.0080
(0.00192)
t2 × s2 (x1000) · · -0.0004
(0.00018)
t2 × s3 (x 1000) · · 0.0000
(0.00001)
t2 × s4 (x1000) · · -0.0000
(0.00000)
Other results
Results before the murder
Constant 11.6211 11.6213 11.6238
(0.02264) (0.02286) (0.02291)
t (x 100) · -0.0002 -0.0007
(0.00008) (0.00026)
t2 · · 0.0163
(0.00860)
Results before the murder, type I neighborhoods
t · 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00001) (0.00001)
t2 (x 1000) · · -0.0000
(0.00001)
Results after the murder
Constant 0.0210 -0.0158 -0.0297
(0.00179) (0.00275) (0.00379)
t · 0.0017 0.0028
(0.00011) (0.00037)
t2 (x 1000) · · -0.0436
(0.00995)
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Table 8, continued
I II III
Control variables
Surface 0.0927 0.0935 0.0934
(0.00111) (0.00107) (0.00107)
Surface2 (x 1000) -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0012
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003)
Apartment -0.0994 -0.1074 -0.1077
(0.00706) (0.00680) (0.00683)
Garage 0.1073 0.0870 0.0887
(0.01355) (0.01335) (0.01337)
Goodness of fit measures
R2 within 0.6529 0.6743 0.6743
R2 between 0.8378 · ·
R2 overall 0.8450 0.8549 0.8553
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Table 9: Minority Percentages, step function
This table shows the impact of s, the minority percentage, on the price dif-
ference between type I and type II neighborhoods. The precentage intervals
represent the breakpoints of the step functions used to model the relation the
minority percentage and the average list price per neighborhood.
I II III
Difference-in-difference estimators
5-10 percent 0.0177 0.0209 0.0259
(0.00180) (0.00250) (0.00345)
10-15 percent -0.0157 0.0106 0.0225
(0.00226) (0.00322) (0.00441)
15-20 percent -0.0248 0.0020 0.0082
(0.00307) (0.00436) (0.00592)
20-25 percent -0.0029 -0.0014 -0.0063
(0.00262) (0.00391) (0.00524)
25-30 percent 0.0049 0.0029 0.0136
(0.00434) (0.00636) (0.00862)
30-35 percent -0.0204 -0.0052 -0.0075
(0.00390) (0.00590) (0.00799)
35-40 percent -0.0198 0.0030 0.0074
(0.00327) (0.00501) (0.00655)
over 40 percent -0.0004 0.0115 0.0003
(0.00424) (0.00630) (0.00833)
t× 5-10 percent (x 100) · -0.0297 -0.0931
(0.00727) (0.02733)
t× 10-15 percent (x 100) · -0.1363 -0.2814
(0.01002) (0.03497)
t× 15-20 percent (x 100) · -0.1576 -0.2391
(0.01374) (0.04677)
t× 20-25 percent (x 100) · -0.0837 -0.0392
(0.01426) (0.04056)
t× 25-30 percent (x 100) · -0.0876 -0.2086
(0.02052) (0.06683)
t× 30-35 percent (x 100) · -0.1700 -0.1372
(0.02104) (0.06261)
t× 35-40 percent (x 100) · -0.2075 -0.2408
(0.02061) (0.05270)
t× over 40 percent (x 100) · -0.1859 -0.0292
(0.02475) (0.06528)
t2× 5-10 percent (x 1000) · · 0.0118
(0.00498)
t2× 10-15 percent (x1000) · · 0.0278
(0.00636)
t2× 15-20 percent (x 1000) · · 0.0168
(0.00846)
t2× 20-25 percent (x1000) · · -0.0045
(0.00727)
t2× 25-30 percent (x 1000) · · 0.0286
(0.01206)
t2× 30-35 percent (x1000) · · 0.0032
(0.01137)
t2× 35-40 percent (x 1000) · · 0.0178
(0.00981)
t2× over 40 percent (x1000) · · -0.0114
(0.01187)
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Table 9, continued
I II III
Other results
Results before the murder
Constant 11.6154 11.6070 11.6111
(0.02252) (0.02262) (0.02264)
t (x 100) · -0.0002 -0.0006
(0.00008) (0.00023)
t2 · · 0.0134
(0.00805)
Results before the murder, type I neighborhoods
t · 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00000) (0.00001)
t2 (x 1000) · · -0.0000
(0.00000)
Results after the murder
Constant 0.0256 -0.0052 -0.0102
(0.00096) (0.00167) (0.00233)
t · 0.0014 0.0014
(0.00008) (0.00028)
Control variables
t2 (x 1000) · · -0.0215
(0.00849)
Surface 0.0930 0.0943 0.0941
(0.00111) (0.00108) (0.00108)
Surface2 (x 1000) -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0012
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003)
Apartment -0.0972 -0.0999 -0.1006
(0.00710) (0.00691) (0.00694)
Garage 0.1089 0.0754 0.0721
(0.01352) (0.01312) (0.01335)
Goodness of fit measures
R2 within 0.6526 0.6752 0.6749
R2 between 0.8339 · ·
R2 overall 0.8451 0.8565 0.8566
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Table 10: Conditioning on the explicit conditional sale.
This table shows the neighborhood-effects using only the houses that are ulti-
mately conditionally sold. The first column lists the estimation results for the
specification of λ(t) = c. The second and third column list the estimation re-
sults for the linear and quadratic specification, respectively. Panel A gives the
diff-in-diff estimates. Panel B to D show the estimation results for the general
price effect before the murder, before the murder in type I neighborhoods, and
after the murder. The variables η, pi, ζ, and ω refer to the variables defined in
Equation (8).
I II III
A: Difference-in-difference estimators
Constant -0.0081 0.0061 -0.0039
(0.0031) (0.0063) (0.0092)
t · -0.0023 -0.0044
(0.0003) (0.0013)
t2 (x 100) · · -0.0075
(0.0041)
Other results
B: Results before the murder
t 11.59 11.58 11.58
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
t2 (x 100) · -0.0005 0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0004)
Constant · · -0.0030
(0.0014)
C: Results before the murder, type I neighborhoods
t · 0.0011 -0.0008
(0.0003) (0.0011)
t2 (x 100) · · 0.0075
(0.0040)
D: Results after the murder
Constant 0.0224 0.0055 0.0014
(0.0011) (0.0022) (0.0032)
t · 0.0014 0.0031
(0.0001) (0.0004)
t2 (x 100) · · 0.0013
(0.0014)
E: Control variables
Surface 0.0907 0.0919 0.0920
(0.00109) (0.00109) (0.00109)
Surface2 (x 1000) -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Apartment -0.0463 -0.0470 -0.0441
(0.00750) (0.00746) (0.0075)
Garage 0.1026 0.1077 0.1082
(0.01290) (0.01284) (0.0128)
Goodness of fit measures
R2 within 0.6510 0.6573 0.6581
R2 between 0.8152 0.7694 ·
R2 overall 0.8036 0.8072 0.8079
Table 11: Estimation results for the duration model
The variables v0 and v1 are mass points of the unobserved heterogeneity distri-
bution and p is the probability that the unobserved heterogeneity term equals
v0.
Variable Estimate
House characteristics
Square footage -0.0035
(0.0004)
Square footage2 (x1000) 0.0027
(0.0006)
Apartment -0.171
(0.043)
Garage attached -0.178
(0.088)
Time effects
1st quarter before the murder 0.057
(0.065)
1st quarter after the murder 0.032
(0.064)
2nd quarter after the murder 0.275
(0.062)
3rd quarter after the murder 0.213
(0.061)
4th quarter after the murder 0.321
(0.062)
Time effects × type I neighborhoods
1st quarter before the murder 0.315
(0.215)
1st quarter after the murder 0.416
(0.210)
2nd quarter after the murder 0.345
(0.207)
3rd quarter after the murder 0.294
(0.207)
4th quarter after the murder 0.315
(0.207)
Duration dependence, baseline: weeks 1-4
Weeks 5-8 1.131
(0.052)
Weeks 9-13 1.611
(0.050)
2nd quarter 1.502
(0.049)
3rd quarter 1.415
(0.056)
4th quarter 1.339
(0.067)
After 4th quarter 1.346
(0.087)
Unobserved heterogeneity
v0 -4.734
(0.178)
v1 –
p 1
(·)
Table 12: Descriptive statistics for the register database.
This table gives the number of houses, mean and standard deviation of the
transactions as registered in the ‘Kadaster’, the Dutch register for (residential)
property. Only houses that have been listed on Funda are included. ‘Listed
price’ is the last price recorded on Funda, the online multi-listing service and our
primary source of data. ‘Registered price’ is the transaction price as registerd by
the Kadaster. ‘Discount’ is the difference between the list price and transaction
price.
Variable Mean Number of Standard
observations deviation
All neigborhoods
Listed price 270609 10480 189267
Registered price 259526 10480 177453
Discount 4.17% 10480 4.74%
Type I-neighborhoods
Listed price 171930 1366 50620
Registered price 165649 1366 52730
Discount 3.82% 1366 4.05%
Type II-neighborhoods
Listed price 285399 9114 197728
Registered price 273596 9114 185221
Discount 4.23% 9114 4.83%
Table 13: Buyers and sellers in type I neighborhoods.
This table shows the percentage of buyers and sellers in type I neighborhoods
that are of Turkish or Moroccan origin. Standard errors are between brackets.
Total Before murder After murder t-value
of difference
Buyers 9.29 8.12 9.87 1.88
(0.45) (0.74) (0.56)
Sellers 4.25 5.14 3.75 -1.64
(0.39) (0.71) (0.46)
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Table 14: Buyers and sellers in type II neighborhoods.
This table shows the percentage of buyers and sellers in type II neighborhoods
that are of Turkish or Moroccan origin. Standard errors are between brackets.
Total Before murder After murder t-value
of difference
Buyers 1.97 1.88 2.04 0.31
(0.26) (0.41) (0.35)
Sellers 0.59 0.81 0.42 -1.16
(0.16) (0.29) (0.19)
Table 15: Results of the block bootstrap exercise
I II III
Actual levels
Constant -5.657 -0.782 -1.808
t -6.428 -2.976
t2 -1.839
Bootstrap critical values at different
significant levels
Constant
1 percent -10.296 -9.761 -5.399
5 percent -7.733 -7.385 -4.194
10 percent -6.289 -6.698 -3.802
Coefficient for t
1 percent -5.981 -4.439
5 percent -4.014 -3.270
10 percent -3.333 -2.789
Coefficient for t2
1 percent -3.459
5 percent -2.483
10 percent -1.974
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Figure 1: The murder of Theo van Gogh in the Dutch media.
This figure displays for any given week the number of newspaper articles found
in all Dutch news sources on LexisNexis, that had the (Dutch) words ‘Gogh’
and ‘moord’ in one sentence. The unit at the x-axis is the number of weeks
starting from the first week in 2004.
 94
 96
 98
 100
 102
 104
 106
 108
-40 -30 -20 -10  0  10  20  30  40  50
Pr
ic
e
Weeks after murder
Type II
Type I
Figure 2: Development of square footage prices in Amsterdam.
The y-axis is measured as an index which equals 100 in week 6 of 2004 for both
neighborhood types.
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Figure 3: Development of square footage in Amsterdam.
The y-axis is measured as an index which equals 100 in week 6 of 2004 for both
neighborhood types.
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Figure 4: Development of in and outflow of new houses at the Funda
website.
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Figure 5: Results for the fixed effects model
This figure shows the results of the fixed effects model concerning the Van
Gogh murder. The middle line is the point estimation for λ(t) in model (2), the
upper and lower lines represent the upper and lower bounds of the 95 percent
confidence interval.
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Figure 6: Quality of the approximation: the constant model.
This figure shows the results for the fixed effects estimation (solid line) together
with the result for the approximating constant model (dashed line).
41
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
 0
 0.01
 0.02
 0.03
-30 -20 -10  0  10  20  30  40  50
Fi
xe
d 
ef
fe
ct
s
Weeks after murder
Fixed effects
Linear approximation
Lower 95 percent
Upper 95 percent
Figure 7: Quality of the approximation: the linear model.
This figure shows the estimation result for the linear model, together with the
95% confidence bands.
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Figure 8: Quality of the approximation: the quadratic model.
This figure shows the estimation result for the quadratic model, together with
the 95% confidence bands.
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Figure 9: Mortgage Interest Rates.
This figure shows mortgage interest rates for 4 different maturities. Monthly
rates are provided by the Netherlands Central Bank (DNB). The rates in the
figure show the weekly interpolations obtained using cubic splines.
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Figure 10: Residuals of the fixed effects regression over time.
This figure shows the residuals of estimated fixed effect on the interest rate
over time.
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Figure 11: Using only first week list price observations.
This figure shows the result of the fixed effects estimation together with the
95% confidence bands when only the first-week list price observations are used.
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Figure 12: The impact of the murder after 13 weeks.
This figure shows the estimated total impact of the murder on list prices at
week 13 relative to the selection criterion for type I neighborhoods in terms of
the percentage of inhabitants with a Turkish or Moroccan surname.
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Figure 13: The impact of the murder after 26 weeks.
This figure shows the estimated total impact of the murder on list prices at
week 26 relative to the selection criterion for type I neighborhoods in terms of
the percentage of inhabitants with a Turkish or Moroccan surname.
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Figure 14: The impact of the murder after 52 weeks.
This figure shows the estimated total impact of the murder on list prices at
week 52 relative to the selection criterion for type I neighborhoods in terms of
the percentage of inhabitants with a Turkish or Moroccan surname.
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Figure 15: Hazard rates.
This figure shows the hazard rates of a house disappearing from the market.
The values in the graph can be interpreted as the probability to sell in the first
week. The unit at the x-axis is the number of weeks starting from the first week
in 2004.
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Figure 16: Average discount over time.
This figure shows the average discount between transaction price and list price.
The discount is computed per month.
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Figure 17: Impact of the murder on the variance.
This figure shows the result of the fixed-effects estimation using the cross-
sectional variance per neighborhood as the dependent variable.
47
